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At the beginning of the 20th Century, the U.S. dairy industry 
was comprised of millions of small-scale operations producing for 
their own or for very local consumption. By the end of the 20th 
Century, the industry was dominated by large-scale producers 
marketing products via large cooperatives. Improvements in 
transportation, advances in animal breeding and feeding 
technologies, and scale economies have allowed the industry to be 
more competitive on global markets, where there is now active 
international trade in dairy products. Major government programs to 
support dairy farm income date back to Depression-era problems 
facing the industry. Federal programs to support dairy income led to 
recurring problems of overproduction. Programs initially instituted 
to protect dairy producers from oligopsony power of purchasers now 
have more questionable effects given industry concentration. 
Increased market concentration has led to ongoing antitrust scrutiny 
of the industry, while geographic concentration of production has 
raised concerns over water and air pollution. At the outset of the 21st 
Century, increased productivity has made the dairy industry less 
reliant on government programs and more reliant on global markets. 
Yet the industry faces many challenges: greater scrutiny over 
greenhouse gas emissions, secular declines in milk prices and U.S. 
per capita milk consumption, reduced viability of small-scale 
operations, and the rise of plant-based milk substitutes. Still, dairies 
and dairy products remain an important part of U.S. agriculture and 
U.S. household food consumption. 
 
I. Introduction  
 
The U.S. dairy industry at the beginning of the 20th Century 
was characterized by diffuse production and geographically 
concentrated consumption.1 By the end of the century, it was 
characterized by concentrated production, with nationally and 
 
 Professor, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, University of 
Arizona. 
1 See M. R. Weimer & D. P. Blayney, Landmarks in the U.S. Dairy Industry, 694 
AGRIC. INFORMATION BULL. 1, 3–4 (1994). The United States Department of 
Agriculture provides statistical data through the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service that may be access publicly online. See generally Quick Stats, NAT’L 
AGRIC. STAT. SERV., https://quickstats.nass.usda.gov/ (last visited February 9, 
2020). 
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globally diffused marketing for consumption.2 Numerous 
technological advances enabled this transformation.3  The federal 
and state governments have also actively intervened in U.S. dairy 
markets.4 Many laws and programs enacted in response to income 
and market problems facing dairy producers at the beginning of the 
century and during the Great Depression remain in effect today.5 Several 
critics have questioned the need for and value of such programs in 
light of modern market realities.6 For example, government 
programs to raise dairy prices have led to waves of overproduction, 
which led to the slaughter of dairy herds.7 As the industry became 
increasingly comprised of larger-scale producers and marketing 
cooperatives, it has faced ongoing antitrust scrutiny from the U.S. 
Department of Justice.8 The rise of farm-level and geographical 
concentration has also presented problems of air and water pollution.9  
 
At the outset of the 21st Century, increased productivity has 
made the dairy industry less reliant on government programs and 
more reliant on global markets.10 Yet, the industry faces many 
challenges: greater scrutiny over greenhouse gas emissions, secular 
declines in milk prices and U.S. per capita milk consumption, 
reduced viability of small-scale operations, and the rise in plant-
based milk substitutes.11 Still, dairies and dairy products remain an 
 
2 See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 5. 
3 See id. 
4 Id. at 17–18. 
5 ERIC M. ERBA & ANDREW M. NOVAKOVIC, THE EVOLUTION OF MILK PRICING AND 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN DAIRY MARKETS 14 (Cornell Program on Dairy 
Mkts. and Policy, EB 95-05, 1995). 
6 Robert T. Masson & Philip M. Eisenstat, The Pricing Policies and Goals of 
Federal Milk Order Regulations: Time for Reevaluation, 23 S.D. L. REV. 662, 663 
(1978). 
7 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 13. 
8 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 674. 
9 JAMES M. MACDONALD ET AL., PROFITS, COSTS, AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE 
OF DAIRY FARMING 31 (U. S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Report No. 47, 
2007). 
10 See DANIEL A. SUMNER, DAIRY POLICY PROGRESS: COMPLETING THE MOVE TO 
MARKETS 9 (2018). 
11 NIGEL KEY & STACY SNEERINGER, CARBON PRICES AND THE ADOPTION OF 
METHANE DIGESTERS ON DAIRY AND HOG FARMS 3–4, 8 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 
Econ. Research Serv., Econ. Brief No. 16, 2011). Hyunok Lee & Daniel A. 
Sumner, Dependence on Policy Revenue Poses Risks for Investments in Dairy 
Digesters, 72 CAL. AGRIC. 226, 227 (2018). HAYDEN STEWART ET AL., WHY ARE 
AMERICANS CONSUMING LESS FLUID MILK? A LOOK AT GENERATIONAL 
DIFFERENCES IN INTAKE FREQUENCY, at i (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research 
Serv., Rep. No. 149, 2013). HAYDEN STEWART AND JERRY CESSNA, LIVESTOCK, 
DAIRY AND POULTRY OUTLOOK: SPECIAL ARTICLE ON DIFFERENT TRAJECTORIES: A 
LOOK AT SALES OF COW’S MILK AND PLANT-BASED MILK ANALOGS 2 (U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., Econ. Research Serv., LDP-M-279 SA, 2017). JAMES M. MACDONALD 
ET AL., PROFITS, COSTS, AND THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF DAIRY FARMING 31 (U. 
S. Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Research Report No. 47, 2007). 




important part of U.S. agriculture and U.S. household food 
consumption.12 
 
II. The U.S. Dairy Industry at the Beginning of the 20th 
Century  
 
At the beginning of the 20th Century, households produced 
milk primarily for home consumption, while markets for milk were 
not yet well developed.13 While most farms had cows, production 
was small-scale and diffuse.14 By 1920, five million US farms had 
dairy cows (compared to 54 thousand today).15 In 1930, 70% of US 
farms had dairy cows, yet sale of dairy products accounted for a 
relatively small share of farm household income.16 Among all farms 
with cows, dairy sales accounted for more than 40% of total farm 
sales on only 14%.17  
 
The scope for marketing dairy products increased with 
improvements in technology and infrastructure.18 Refrigerated tanker 
cars allowed rail shipments of milk across longer distances, allowing 
transportation of milk from rural areas to fast-growing urban ones.19  
The introduction of trucks and improved roads gave producers 
greater flexibility and control in milk shipping.20 Production of 
evaporated milk, processed cheese, and butter, which were less 
perishable than fluid milk, all became more widespread.21 There was 
more scope for storing and marketing these processed products over 
greater distances.22 But, after World War I, European demand for those 
U.S. dairy products that could be preserved and shipped more easily 
dropped, leading to falling dairy prices.23 
 
 
12 M. SWEITZER ET AL., FOOD-AT-HOME EXPENDITURES: COMPARING COMMERCIAL 
HOUSEHOLD SCANNER DATA FROM IRI AND GOVERNMENT SURVEY DATA 16 (U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., Econ. Res. Serv., TB-1946, 2017). NAT’L AGRIC. STATISTICS 
SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ACH17-4, 2017 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE 
HIGHLIGHTS: DAIRY CATTLE AND MILK PRODUCTION 1 (2019), 
https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/Highlights/2019/2017Census_DairyCattle
_and_Milk_Production.pdf.   
13 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1. 
14 See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4. 
15 For historical numbers, see id. at 3. For current numbers, see Quick Stats, supra 
note 1.  
16 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 4. 
17 Id. 
18 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
19 Id. at 1. 
20 Id. 
21 See Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
22 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 1 and 4. 
23 Id. at 4. 
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Moreover, many barriers remained to permit orderly 
marketing of milk.24 First, farm households lacked many basic 
resources: only 58% had cars, 25% had telephones, and 33% had 
electricity.25 Few farms then had refrigeration.26 Fluid milk is 
produced daily on dairies.27 Yet, it is highly perishable even with 
refrigeration (which most farms still lacked).28 Without phones, it 
was difficult for farmers to find and negotiate with buyers.29 Prices 
were based on weight and butterfat content, but farmers could not 
know if their milk that was shipped more distantly was being 
weighed and tested fairly by milk purchasers.30 On the other side, 
handlers were not assured the milk they contracted for in advance 
was not soured or tainted.31  
 
Fluid milk was bulky and difficult to transport over long 
distances.32 It is also highly perishable, greatly limiting the space and 
time over which it may be transported and consumed.33 In urban 
centers, there were a relatively small number of large milk buyers 
(called handlers) purchasing milk from a large number of small, 
unorganized producers.34 This market structure gave handlers 
oligopsony power to push down milk purchase prices below 
competitive levels.35  
 
To countervail this oligopsony power, dairy producers began 
to organize collectively in cooperatives to bargain over the prices of 
dairy products they received.36  Handlers countered this collective 
action in court, arguing that such explicit cooperation by sellers 
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.37 The Clayton Act of 
191438 explicitly exempted non-stock agricultural associations from 
antitrust laws, but did not address some of the vague wording of the 
Sherman Act that left the status of cooperative marketing 
 
24 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 668–69. 
25 MARYANNA S. SMITH & DENNIS M. ROTH, CHRONOLOGICAL LANDMARKS IN 
AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 63 (U.S. Dep’t of Agric., Agric. Info. Bulletin No. 425, 
1990).   
26 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 3. 
27 SUMNER, supra note 10, at 5. 
28 Id.; see Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670. 




33 Id.; see SUMNER, supra note 10, at 5. 
34 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2. 
35 See Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 670. 
36 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2. 
37 See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38 (2019); see ERBA & 
NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2. 
38 Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (2019). 




associations ambiguous.39 To partially address this ambiguity, 
Congress annually passed “riders” on appropriations for the 
Department of Justice, prohibiting it from prosecuting cooperating 
farmers.40 Dairy producers began organizing large-scale “milk 
strikes” withholding milk to cities.41  
 
To address these ongoing issues, the 1922 Capper-Volstead 
Act 42 allowed farmers limited exemptions from antitrust controls of 
the Clayton and Sherman Antitrust Act, allowing them to organize to 
collectively set product prices.43 Passage of Capper-Volstead was 
controversial at the time, with concerns that the antitrust exemption 
would give dairy cooperative marketing associations too much 
power to raise prices, at the expense of consumers.44 Senator Atlee 
Pomerene of Ohio argued, “There is nothing in this bill to prevent a 
combination of men who are dealing in food products – and I refer 
to the dairymen – from getting the most exorbitant prices, and doing 
so at the expense of the babes of the country.”45 Capper-Volstead 
prohibited “undue price enhancement” by cooperatives, but did not 
specify what constituted “undue.”46 Further, authority to monitor and 
temper agricultural cooperative pricing behavior was given to the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) rather than the Department 
of Justice.47 USDA was perceived at the time to be more sympathetic 
to farm interests (and less likely to restrict their behavior).48   
 
In the 1930s, while court decisions restricted cooperatives 
from interstate marketing of dairy products, courts tended to uphold 
cooperative intrastate marketing.49 California, a major dairy state, 
adopted an intrastate marketing organization in the early 1930s, which 
is still in effect today.50 Despite Capper-Volstead, cooperative 
marketing associations were largely unsuccessful in raising dairy 
product prices, for two reasons.51 First, because milk is highly 
perishable, its value falls dramatically over a short time.52 The threat 
by dairies of withholding milk supplies was less credible than for 
 
39 James L. Guth, Farmer Monopolies, Cooperatives, and the Intent of Congress: 
Origins of the Capper-Volstead Act, 56 AGRIC. HIST. 67, 68 (1982). 
40 Id. 
41 Id.  
42 Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 291–92 (2020). 
43 Id.; see Guth, supra note 36, at 82. 
44 Guth, supra note 36, at 75. 
45 Id. at 78. 
46 7 U.S.C. § 292. 
47 Guth, supra note 36, at 82. 
48 See id. 
49 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 7. 
50 Id. 
51 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 5. 
52 See id. at 3. 
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more easily storable agricultural commodities.53 Second, because the 
associations were voluntary, producers were not compelled to join 
them, and those not in associations often sold into the urban markets 
(acting as “strikebreakers”).54 
 
In the wake of the Great Depression, the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 (AAA) was passed, giving the Secretary of 
Agriculture authority to impose production controls to reduce 
commodity surpluses and raise prices.55 The AAA provided for the 
establishment of marketing orders.56 Unlike cooperative associations, 
marketing orders had aspects of mandatory compulsion.57 Growers 
within a designated region could vote on whether to form a marketing 
order, with the referenda requiring a super-majority to assent.58 Once 
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture, however, the rules of the 
order applied to all producers in the region.59 Thus, producers were no 
longer able to free ride and undercut arrangements negotiated by the 
order.  
In 1935, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
National Industrial Recover Act was an unconstitutional delegation 
of power.60 The AAA was amended in 1935 to address the Court’s 
ruling, but in 1936 the Supreme Court ruled that the 1935 AAA 
violated the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.61 To address 
the Court’s ruling, Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing and 
Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), which among other things 
specified the Secretary’s powers over establishment and enforcement 
of marketing orders more clearly.62 The AMAA also brought all 
handlers (buyer processors) in an approved marketing order area 
under the authority of the order.63 Minimum prices for different types 
of dairy products were set for all handlers in an order.64  
 
53 See ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 2. Swantz, Alexander. "How we came 
to have federal milk marketing orders: What they are and what they do." Journal 
of Dairy Science 45, no. 11 (1962): 1397-1402, at 1398. 
54 Id. at 5.  
55 See Paul L. Murphy, The New Deal Agricultural Program and the Constitution, 
29 AGRIC. HIST. 160, 160–69 (1955). 
56 Id. at 161. 
57 See id. at 160–62. 
58 See id. 
59 See id. 
60 Schechter Poultry Co. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 550–51 (1935); Murphy, supra 
note 51, at 160. 
61 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 77–78 (1936); Murphy, supra note 51, at 
160–61. 
62 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat. 
246 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.); Murphy, supra note 
51, at 163. 
63 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-137, 50 Stat. 
246; see Murphy, supra note 51, at 163–64. 
64 See Murphy, supra note 51, at 163. 





When some processors refused to pay assessments under and 
order, the United States filed a complaint against them in October 27, 
1938.65 The processors countered that the marketing order and the 
AMAA of 1937 was unconstitutional, infringing on their Fifth 
Amendment rights to due process, their property rights under the 
Fourth Amendment, and on rights reserved only for states under the 
Tenth Amendment.66 The District Court concurred, and the United 
States appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.67 The Court upheld both 
the AMAA and the Milk Order in a 5 to 4 decision, citing both 
Congress’ authority to regulate economic activity through the 
Interstate Commerce Clause and under its power to authorize 
regulatory powers it deemed necessary, even if this granted powers 
to the Executive Branch (i.e., the Secretary of Agriculture).68  
 
The AMAA and subsequent legislation in the 1940s 
solidified key aspects of U.S. dairy policy.69 These included:  
• Establishment of Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMO) 
across different regions and states;70 the FMMOs allowed 
dairy producers to coordinate to increase their sales 
revenue;71 
• Government price supports for dairy products carried out by 
direct government purchases of dairy products;72 
• Dairy product import controls;73  
• Disposal of “surplus” dairy products by channeling them to 
foreign relief, the School Lunch Program, and other 
outlets.74  
 
The Steagall Amendment of 1941 established a support price 
for dairy products promoted my government purchases of butter 
(which could be stored).75 Under the Agricultural Act of 1949, 
government purchases of dairy products to support farm income was 
 
65 United States v. Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 540 (1939); see 9 
NEIL E. HARL & CHARLES F. CURTISS, AGRICULTURAL LAW § 70.01[3] (2007). 
66 Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. at 541, 568; see HARL & CURTISS, supra 
note 61, at § 70.01[3]. 
67 HARL & CURTISS, supra note 61, at § 70.01[3]; see Rock Royal Cooperative, 
Inc., 307 U.S. at 539–41. 
68 Rock Royal Cooperative, Inc., 307 U.S. at 568–71, 577–78; see HARL & 
CURTISS, supra note 61, at § 70.01[3]. 
69 See generally SUMNER, supra note 10. 
70 Id. at 8, 10. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 8–9. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 ERBA & NOVAKOVIC, supra note 5, at 8. 
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formalized as a central policy.76 Section 22 of the original, 1933 
AMAA included provisions for import controls.77 These were first 
applied with implementation of the Trade Agreements Extension Act 
of 1951.78 Imported products were typically limited to 3% or less of 
U.S. milk production.79 Import restrictions were another means to 
maintain the government support price.80  
 
These policies sought to address a host of problems facing 
dairy farming in particular, and U.S. agriculture in general, in the 
1930s.  First, there were certain aspects of agriculture that led to what 
was called “the farm problem.”81  Both the demand and supply of 
dairy products was inelastic – both consumption and production 
changed relatively little in response to changes in market prices.82  
Related to this feature, small changes in consumer demand or 
production could cause large fluctuations in milk prices.83 Next, 
demand for dairy products was growing slowly, while technological 
innovations were causing supply to increase faster.84 As production 
outstripped demand, this placed downward pressure on prices.85 A 
related problem was what Cochrane called the “agricultural 
treadmill.”86 Farmers adopting cost-reducing technologies or 
improved practices could sell at lower prices than non-adopters.87 
This downward price pressure induced other operators to adopt cost-
cutting technologies and practices in order to survive in the market.88 
This, in turn, increased supply further, starting another cycle of price 




77 Id. at 9. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.  
80 See id. 
81 John M. Crespi & Richard J. Sexton, 
Concurrence, Coopératives de Producteurs et Marketing Orders aux États-Unis 
[Competition, U.S. Farmer Cooperatives, and Marketing Orders], 277–78 
ÉCONOMIE RURALE 135, 135 (2003) (Fr.), English translation available in 
RESEARCHGATE, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/289527129_Crespi-
Sexton-EconRurale-ENGLISH; Bruce L. Gardner, Changing Economic 
Perspectives on the Farm Problem, 30 J. ECON. LITERATURE 62, 62 (1992). 




86 WILLARD W. COCHRANE, FARM PRICES: MYTH AND REALITY 96–97 (1958). 
87 See id. at 95. 
88 Id. at 96. 
89 Id. at 95. 




Marketing orders and dairy cooperatives were also supposed 
to address the oligopsony power of milk handlers.90 Collective action 
by dairy producers was intended to provide countervailing power to 
such buyer market power.91 Economic theory suggests that buyers 
who exercise oligopsony power restrict purchases and lower prices 
for the inputs they purchase.92  In the case of milk, this would lead to 
lower prices dairies received for milk and lower volumes of milk 
purchased.93  This latter would also reduce the supply of milk 
available to final consumers.94 Theory also suggests that if sellers 
coordinate action in this type of market, they can increase both the 
price they receive and sales.95 This raises both overall economic 
welfare and benefits final milk consumers because greater 
production lowers consumer prices.96 While the 1937 Act established 
programs to raise dairy farm income, policies to raise farm prices 
were to, “be in the public interest.”97  
 
Finally, the marketing orders were intended to use 
coordination to overcome a host of communication, transportation, 
and technological impediments to marketing milk.98  An explicit goal 
of legislation was to promote “orderly marketing” of products.99   
 
Further, dairy legislation was drafted in the context of rural 
poverty and nutrition concerns during the Great Depression.100 For 
example, there was concern that if a large share of dairy operations 
went out of production, it would take years to rebuild production 
capacity.101 This would lead to price spikes later, once consumer 
demand recovered.102  But, such price spikes would harm consumers. 
Further, rural poverty (as illustrated by popular literature such as 
Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath and by Dorothea Lange’s iconic 
photographs of the rural poor for the Farm Security Administration) 
was a major macroeconomic problem.103 Then, a large share of the 
 
90 David L. Baumer et al., Curdling the Competition: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis of the Antitrust Exemption for Agriculture, 31 VILL. L. REV. 183, 185 
(1986). 
91 Id. at 185 & n.8. 
92 Id. at 197 & n.46. 
93 See id. 
94 Id. at 198. 
95 Id. at 196; see Roger D. Blair et al., A Pedagogical Treatment of Bilateral 
Monopoly, 55 S. ECON. J. 831, 831–41 (1989). 
96 Baumer et al., supra note 86, at 198. 
97 Masson & Eisenstat, supra note 6, at 662–63. 
98 See id. at 670. 
99 Id. at 662. 
100 See id. at 678. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See generally SUSAN LEVINE, SCHOOL LUNCH POLITICS: THE SURPRISING 
HISTORY OF AMERICA’S FAVORITE WELFARE PROGRAM 40, 46 (2008). 
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U.S. population still resided on farms.104 A motivation of providing 
milk for the School Lunch Program and dairy products as foreign aid, 
aside from supporting farm income, was to improve nutrition of low-
income, vulnerable populations.105   
 
III. The Dairy Industry in the Latter Half of the 20th 
Century  
 
Throughout the latter half of the 20th Century, the dairy 
industry and federal dairy policy faced several challenges. While the 
USDA intervened significantly to increase dairy prices, these myriad 
market interventions often had unintended negative consequences, 
which led to a cascade of new interventions (with their own 
contradictions).106 Protected from antitrust limits by the Capper-
Volstead Act, and encouraged by economies of scale, dairies and 
marketing cooperatives grew larger and larger.107 Various tactics by 
large cooperatives to increase their market power led to greater 
Justice Department scrutiny and initiatives to limit what was 
characterized as their anti-competitive behavior.108 This has raised 
various legal questions about the appropriate limits of cooperative 
and marketing order behavior under Capper-Volstead.109  Finally, 
programs to “dispose of” surplus milk via foreign aid and federal 
nutrition programs sought to simultaneously (a) raise farm income 
and (b) improve nutrition of the economically vulnerable.110  Some 
commentators began to question whether the farm income support 
goal of these programs was promoted at the expense of nutrition and 
anti-poverty goals.111   
 
A. Difficulties Maintaining Federal Price Supports  
 
 
104 See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, ANALYZING THE SMALL 
CITY AND RURAL MARKET AREA 3 (1933). 
105 LEVINE, supra note 99, at 46.   
106 Id. at 46; E. Dale Odom, Associated Milk Producers, Incorporated: Testing the 
Limits of Capper-Volstead, 59 AGRIC. HIST. 40, 46 nn. 10–11 (1985). 
107 See Odom, supra note 102, at 47–48. 
108 Id. at 50. 
109 Id. at 52–53. 
110 LEVINE, supra note 99, at 46.   
111 J. Amy Dillard, Sloppy Joe, Slop, Sloppy Joe: How USDA Commodities 
Dumping Ruined the National School Lunch Program, 87 OR. L. REV. 221, 223 
(2008); Michael T. Belongia, The Dairy Price Support Program: A Study of 
Misdirected Economic Incentives, 66 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 5, 14 (1984); 
see Michael Correll, Getting Fat on Government Cheese: The Connection Between 
Social Welfare Participation, Gender, and Obesity in America, 18 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 45, 46 (2010). 




The Agriculture Act of 1949 established the Milk Price 
Support Program (MPSP).112 Under the MPSP, USDA would 
purchase less perishable dairy products, such as cheddar cheese, 
nonfat dry milk, and butter at a pre-determined, government set 
price.113  USDA would commit to purchasing as much of these 
products as the dairy industry could supply at these support prices.114  
The law also required the Secretary of Agriculture to set a minimum 
price support for fluid milk as well as these manufactured dairy 
products.115  Because fluid milk is an input into manufactured dairy 
products, government purchases of manufactured products bid up the 
price of milk.116  The MPSP did not, however, place any limits on the 
quantity of milk that dairies could produce.117   
 
The intention of the program was to take dairy products off 
the market in times when prices were low and then make them 
available when prices recovered.118 The government sent nonfat dry 
milk abroad as food aid through Food for Peace programs.119 Some 
cheddar cheese and butter was distributed to the School Lunch 
Program, by other federal nutrition programs, by Veterans 
Administration hospitals, and by federal prisons.120 The rest was 
stored in warehouses or underground caverns. 121 
 
The post-World War II period saw a series of technological 
innovations that reduced the costs of dairy production.122 In the 
1950s, producers began adopting antibiotics and sulfa drugs to 
combat mastitis and other diseases.123 This increased milk production 
per cow.124 The use of mathematical linear programming techniques 
allowed researchers to develop least-cost feed rations.125  Use of 
mainframe computers in the 1960s made it easier for feed companies 
 
112 Katherine Lacy et al., Government Cheese: A Case Study of Price Supports, 2 
APPLIED ECON. TEACHING RESOURCES 14, 17 (2020). 
113 Id. 
114 See id. 
115 Id. 
116 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO-42-823, CONSEQUENCES OF DAIRY PRICE 
SUPPORT POLICY 15 (1979). 
117 Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 17; see Jeffrey LaFrance & Harry de Gorter, 
Regulation in a Dynamic Market: The U.S. Dairy Industry, 67 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 
821, 821–32 (1985).  
118 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 112, at 22–24. 
119 See Seth King, Dairy Support Prices to Increase on April 1, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
12, 1978, at 19. 
120 See Lacy et al., supra note 108, at 20. 
121 See id. 
122 Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 10-11 
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and Cooperative Extension to quickly develop and disseminate 
information about these least-cost rations.126 By the late 1970s, 
artificial insemination was wide used for dairy cow breeding.127 
These innovations all acted to push down costs and increase supplies 
of dairy products.128 These growing supplies made it more difficult 
for the government to support prices above market levels.129 
    
Government price supports were trimmed in the Nixon and 
Ford administrations under the tenure of Secretary of Agriculture, 
Earl Butz.130 In attempts to control inflation in the early 1970s, the 
Nixon Administration relaxed certain dairy product import quotas.131 
Increased imports and expansion of domestic production led to 
subsequent price collapses.132  In response, farmers lobbied Congress 
and pushed 1976 presidential candidates for more government 
support.133  Newly-elected President Carter signed the Food and 
Agricultural Act of 1977, which increased the milk support price by 
11% in 1978 and another 14% in 1979.134  
 
With guaranteed higher prices, dairy production expanded, 
inducing the USDA to stockpile even more products to support 
prices.135 Each year, though, dairies had an economic incentive to 
over-produce, which only increased government acquisitions further 
to support prices.136 Dairies produced 10% more milk per year than 
the private market demanded at support prices.137  From 1977 to 1981 
alone, the USDA bought up and stored more than 560 million pounds 
of cheddar cheese alone.138 Government dairy program spending rose 
above $2 billion per year.139  By 1981, government stocks of dairy 
products were growing by 20 million pounds per week.140 The 
Reagan Administration attempted to reign in dairy program spending 
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127  Weimer & Blayney, supra note 1, at 5. 
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and accumulation of dairy product stocks, without much success 
initially.141 The 1981 Agriculture and Food Act, slowed the rate of 
support price increases. 142 The Administration authorized the release 
of what became known as “government cheese” – stockpiled cheese 
distributed to low-income people via food banks, food pantries, and 
other non-profit organizations.143  Yet, because dairies could sell to 
the government at high prices, supply continued to expand as 
producers adopted output-expanding technologies and practices.144 
Stocks continued to accumulate.145  
  
The 1983 Dairy Production Stabilization Act established the 
Milk Diversion Program (MDP) to control the supply of milk.146 The 
federal government offered dairy farmers $10-per-hundredweight to 
reduce their sales below their historical production.147 More than 2 
billion pounds of these reductions, however, were only “air” as many 
producers had already reduced their production prior to signing 
contracts.148 Thus, a significant portion of program funds went to 
producers who were planning to reduce their production anyway. 
There was further slippage as dairy producers who did not sign up 
for the MDP increased their production.149 Total U.S. milk 
production increased to record levels, again triggering even more 
government dairy purchases.150  
 
The Dairy Production Stabilization Act did, however, set in 
place reductions in the support price.151 The USDA also instituted the 
Dairy Termination Program (DTP) to control supplies.152 Under the 
DTP, the federal government bought out entire dairy herds, with 
farmers committing to forego dairying for five years.153 The 
government slaughtered or exported animals from purchased 
herds.154 Operating from April, 1986 to September 1987, the program 
cost more than $1.8 billion,  155 with more than 1.4 million animal 
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slaughtered.156 Originally authorized under the Food Security Act of 
1985,157 the Dairy Export Incentive Program provided subsidies to 
exporters shipping dairy products abroad.158 The Dairy Production 
Stabilization Act159 also created the National Dairy Board (NDB), 
which from 1984 to 1987 spent more than $100 million in television 
and radio advertising to promote dairy products.160 There is some 
evidence that the advertising and promotional programs succeeded in 
increasing the demand for milk.161 Through this combination of 
reduced price supports, export subsidies, increased demand via 
advertising, and animal slaughter, dairy over-supply problems began 
to ebb.162 USDA stocks of dairy products began to fall steadily starting 
in 1984.163 
 
Since the late 1980s, structural and technological change in 
the U.S. industry has dramatically reduced the cost of U.S. 
production.164 This had the effect of making U.S. products more 
competitive on global markets.165 The early 1980s were 
characterized by U.S. export subsidies and tight import restrictions 
keeping competing products out of U.S. markets.166 As U.S. 
production became more competitive, world prices rather than 
government support prices served as a price floor for U.S. dairy 
commodities.167 By the 1990s, government support prices were 
rarely in effect.168 The 2014 Farm Bill (Agricultural Act of 2014) 
eliminated price supports and export subsidies altogether.169 The 
U.S. still has what Sumner has called a “mind-boggling array of TRQ 
regulations.”170 TRQs (tariff rate quotas) essentially act as import 
quotas, and the United States still maintains many of these for dairy 
products.171 Yet, Sumner has assessed these have relatively little 
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effect, favoring a few companies, but with little effects on larger 
markets.172  
 
Two major remaining components of U.S. dairy policy are 
the Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) and a relatively new 
Margin Protection Program (MPP), which, on the surface, operates 
as a revenue insurance program.173 Producers can take out (highly 
subsidized) insurance policies that protect them when the price of 
animal feed rises relative to milk prices.174 Like US crop insurance 
programs, payments can be more than actuarially fair.175 In other 
words, indemnity payments can regularly exceed payment premiums 
(i.e., some can regularly make money from their insurance).176 Similar 
to crop insurance, when MPP constitutes essentially a disguised 
federal income payment. In cases where signing up does not provide 
producers such assured returns, producers have either not signed up at 
all or have signed up at the minimum level of coverage, which requires 
zero premiums.177  
 
 B. Nutrition Programs  
 
The distribution of government-purchased dairy products as 
domestic or international food aid dates back to the AAA of 1935.178 
Surplus dairy products were distributed under the School Lunch 
Programs, first established in 1935.179  The Agricultural Act of 1954 
established the Special School Milk Program to use USDA funds to 
increase fluid milk consumption in schools.180 The program was 
extended in 1956 to include “nonprofit summer camps, orphanages, and 
other child-care institutions.”181 The national Food Stamp Program was 
approved and made part of permanent agricultural legislation in 1964.182 
Implementation of USDA nutrition programs have not been without 
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controversy.183 Programs have been tasked with achieving multiple 
goals, disposing of government purchased surpluses, increasing 
demand for competing commodities (and pleasing competing 
commodity groups), and improving nutrition of low income or other 
target populations.184 Controversies have arisen when farm income 
support and nutrition objectives have not coincided.185 Some critics 
have argued that the farm income support objectives have taken 
precedent over nutrition goals.186 
 
C. Challenges to Capper-Volstead Exemptions 
 
Federal Milk Marketing Orders (FMMOs) increase dairy 
producer incomes through price discrimination.187 FMMOs divide the 
country into geographic regions.188 There have been as many as 42, 
but that has been reduced to 11.189 Milk and dairy product processors 
in each region are required to pay farmers at least a minimum price for 
four classes of milk defined by the Federal government.190 Class I is 
the milk used for fluid beverage products.191 The price of fluid milk is 
relatively inelastic – the quantity that consumers demand changes little 
relative to changes in the price of milk.192 Conversely, if the quantity 
available of milk falls, the price increases more proportionally than the 
quantity reduction.193 So, limiting supplies increases sales revenues. 
Demand for fluid milk is inelastic because it is highly perishable and 
expensive to transport, so fluid milk in a particular area faces little 
competition from outlying areas.194 Demand for manufactured milk 
products (e.g. cheese, butter) can be stored longer and transported less 
expensively.195 These products face more regional and even global 
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price competition.196 Because of this, demand for these products is 
more price elastic.197 Changes in the amount supplied have a relatively 
small impact on the price producers receive.198  
 
Marketing orders increase producer income by setting a high 
price for fluid milk and reducing its supply below competitive 
levels.199 At the same time production is shunted toward 
manufactured products.200 As output of manufactured products 
increases, their prices fall only a little bit.201 When the supply of fluid 
milk is reduced, though, its price rises a lot.202 Dairy producers 
receive a blend price that is a weighted average of fluid milk and 
manufactured dairy product prices.203 Compared to a competitive 
market outcome, more milk is produced overall, but less actually is 
sold as fluid milk, while more is sold in the form of manufactured 
products.204 How individual consumers are affected overall by the 
price changes depends on their relative expenditures on fluid milk 
versus processed dairy products.205 Consumers, on the whole, are 
made worse off, though, as consumer losses from higher fresh milk 
prices outweigh gains from lowered prices of manufactured 
products.206 
 
The economic welfare effects of marketing orders depend on 
one’s reference point. Gardner (1984) characterized competing views 
of U.S. dairy policy.207 One was of “market failure” story, where dairy 
policy is designed to counter anti-competitive behavior of milk 
processors.208 The Capper Volstead Act was passed at a time when 
technological and institutional constraints presented severe problems 
for dairy producers.209 In the 1920s on-farm refrigeration was limited 
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as was transportation infrastructure.210 Dairies were captive to a small 
number of buyers in the nearest urban centers to their farms.211 Dairies 
marketed their wares individually and so had little bargaining 
power.212 In contrast, handlers had great scope to exert monopsony 
power.213 Capper Volstead allowed dairies to organize to set prices, 
but the intent was to countervail monopsony power.214  The 
Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 and subsequent legislation 
supported formation of milk marketing orders and marketing 
cooperatives.215  At the time, dairy production was small-scale and 
marketing largely uncoordinated.216   
 
A competing perspective was one of “capture” where dairy 
producers were able to influence USDA policy to their benefit at 
consumer and taxpayer expense.217 As dairy marketing became more 
consolidated, sentiment, particularly by the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Department of Justice began to shift toward the 
capture perspective.218  In the post-World War II era, technological 
and institutional change fundamentally altered how dairy products 
were marketed.219 First, improvements in roads, refrigeration, and 
shipping technology meant that dairies could sell their product to 
more distant markets, lessening the need to only sell to the most local 
processors.220  Also, dairy marketing cooperatives began to 
consolidate, increasing their geographic scope and market power.221 
The large cooperative, American Milk Producers Incorporated 
(AMPI) formed in 1969 out of several mergers of smaller 
cooperatives in 1967.222 Over the next three years AMPI merged with 
54 more cooperatives223 until it stretched from Texas to the Canadian 
Border.224 By the mid-1970s, AMPI produced about one eighth of all 
milk sold in the United States and had become the largest cheese 
producer in the world.225 Around this time, two other large 
cooperatives were formed via merger: Mid-America Dairymen 
(Mid-Am) and Dairyman, Inc. (DI).226 In many markets, AMPI, Mid-
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Am or DI controlled 90% or more of all raw milk sales.227 By 1982, 
these three cooperatives, along with Land O’Lakes were all Fortune 
500 companies.228 
 
Justice Department economists began to argue that actions 
of the larger cooperatives went beyond just countervailing the 
market power of milk purchasers.229 They argued that the largest 
cooperatives were exercising supervailing power.230 While 
countervailing power would lead to greater milk sales (and lower 
prices) to consumers, the exercise of supervailing power was meant 
to increase cooperative profits at the expense of consumers, raising 
prices above competitive levels.231 Economists at the Federal Trade 
Commission and Justice Department conducted econometric market 
studies estimating the effects of cooperative behavior on prices and 
consumer welfare.232 Kwoka estimated that marketing orders raised 
milk prices 7-15% above competitive levels and created a 
deadweight loss to the economy of $55 to $180 million per year.233 
Ippolito and Masson estimated that U.S. milk marketing orders, by 
increasing fluid milk prices, transferred $210 million from 
consumers to producers.234 Masson and Eisenstat estimated that 
U.S. dairy cooperatives succeeded in raising retail fluid milk prices 
by $0.07 -$0.10 per gallon, costing consumers of $71 million per 
year from 1967-1975.235 
 
In addition to such studies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
also began to take a more aggressive stance to reign in what was 
perceived as excessive anticompetitive behavior.236 The DOJ sued 
the three large cooperatives, AMPI, Mid-Am and DI in 1972.237 
DOJ alleged the cooperatives engaged in “predatory pricing, price 
squeezes, and foreclosure of nonmembers from customers through 
contracts and mergers with nonfarmer milk processors.”238 DOJ 
signed a consent decree with AMPI in 1975 and one with Mid-Am 
in 1977.239 In the AMPI consent decree, AMPI did not admit to any 
wrongdoing, but agreed to desist from specific "predatory and 
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exclusionary" practices.240 AMPI also lost that part of the major 
private case charging conspiracy to monopolize.241 In 1976, the suit 
against DI went to trial in 1976 and was eventually resolved in 1985, 
partially in the DOJ's favor.242  Studies found that after the consent 
decrees, cooperatives were less able to exercise market power to push 
fluid milk prices significantly above minimum government support 
prices.243 In other cases, courts have ruled that cooperatives 
attempting to further monopoly power by acquiring investor-owned 
firms, engaging in predatory practices, or forming joint ventures with 
non-cooperative businesses are not protected by Capper Volstead 
exemptions and are subject to prosecution under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.244 
 
IV. The U.S. Dairy Landscape Today  
 
Dairy production is important to US farm and food systems. 
In 2018, the United States produced more than 200 billion pounds of 
milk, 13 billion pounds of cheese, 840 million gallons of ice cream, 
and 50 million gallons of frozen yogurt.245 Dairy farming, product 
processing, and wholesaling employed more than 290,000 workers, 
who received more than $15 billion in wages in 2018.246 According 
to the most recent, 2017 Census of Agriculture, farms sold nearly $37 
billion of milk, accounting for about 9% of total U.S. farm sales.247 
U.S. households spend roughly $8 per week on dairy products on 
average, with spending ranging from $4 per week for low income 
households to nearly $12 per week for high income ones.248 
Households with lower incomes, children, or both tend to have a 
higher share of dairy spending in the form of fresh milk.249   
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Milk production is characterized by concentration regionally 
and across operations.250 Five states – California, Wisconsin, Idaho, 
New York, and Texas – account for more than half of all U.S. milk 
production.251 The top eight states (adding Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
and Minnesota) account for two-thirds.252 In 2017, there were more 
than 9.5 million milk cows on more than 54,000 U.S. farm 
operations.253 About 15,000 operations had no milk sales.254 These 
were comprised almost entirely of operations with herds of 19 or 
fewer cows.255 Of farms that did have sales, those with herds of fewer 
than 100 cows accounted for nearly two-thirds of operations, but only 
11% of sales.256 In contrast, just 5% of farms had dairy herds of 1,000 
or more cows, but these farms accounted for more than half of all 
milk sales.257 About 84% of milk sold in the United States is 
marketed by dairy farmer-owned cooperatives.258  The four largest of 
these – Dairy Farmers of America, Land O’Lakes, Dairy Farmers 
Incorporated, and Darigold Inc. – market about 40% of all U.S. 
milk.259   
 
From 1980 to 2018, the total U.S. dairy herd size has 
declined about 12%, but milk produced per cow has more than 
doubled.260 The average number of milk cows per farm with cows 
rose from about 50 in the 1987 Census of Agriculture to about 175 in 
the 2017 Census.261 Another measure of dairy scale is the midpoint 
herd size – the size for which half of all milk cows are in herds of 
that size or larger.262 This midpoint has risen from 80 cows in 1987 
to 900 cows in 2012, and to more than 1,000 cows by 2017.263  
The United States has become a major exporter of some 
dairy products, especially dry milk powder, while still being a 
significant importer of others, particularly cheese.264 From 2004 to 
2014, U.S. dairy product exports more than quadrupled.265 Overall, 
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the United State is the third largest global exporter of dairy products, 
following New Zealand and the European Union (EU).266 
 
What can we glean from this dizzying array of dairy facts and 
figures? First, the U.S. dairy industry remains a central part of U.S. 
agriculture, while dairy products remain an important part of consumer 
diets. It is a technologically dynamic sector, demonstrating impressive 
and sustained productivity growth. A driving factor behind this growth 
are scale economies that have allowed producers to lower average 
costs by increasing operation size.267 Today, the U.S. dairy industry is 
dominated by large-scale operations, with marketing dominated by 
large-scale marketing cooperatives.268 Productivity growth has made 
U.S. dairy production more competitive in international markets.269 
This has shifted the U.S. policy stance away from protectionism to a 
more outward looking export orientation.270 The United States has 
abandoned dairy product export subsidies and moved away from 
import controls and tariffs (although this has been incomplete).271 
The industry has moved toward less government intervention in 
general (although substantial involvement remains).272  
 
A. Technological and Structural Change  
 
Larger dairy farms have been able to take better advantage 
of a range of technologies and practices (Table 1).273 Larger 
operations make greater use of artificial insemination as well as 
services of veterinarians and nutritionists.274 They are also far more 
likely to use computers to deliver feed to cattle and for milking.275 
As operations have grown, dairies have relied less on producing their 
own feed and raising their own heifers (as replacements) and more 
on purchasing them from other operations.276 While smaller 
operations produce more of their own feed, larger operations are 
more specialized, purchasing it from others.277 Larger farms are also 
more likely to enter into forward pricing contracts for inputs 
(primarily feed).278 This reduces their risks against unexpected 
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increases in feed prices.279 Larger farms can also use their size to 
increase their bargaining power, negotiating input prices, rather than 
accepting them as given.280 
 
Table 1. Comparison of dairy practice adoption for three different 
herd sizes  
 Herd Size (number of cows) 
Practices <50 200-499 >1,999 
 Percent of Farms Adopting Practice 
Artificial insemination 75 80 99 
Routine veterinary service 43 89 96 
Nutritionist service 59 87 95 
All feed purchased 2 5 21 
Most feed purchased 36 54 95 
Heifers off-farm 1 10 31 
Forward contract inputs 7 49 69 
Negotiate for inputs 17 63 93 
Computers for feed delivery 1 16 69 
Computers for milking 1 24 33 
Source: MacDonald et al., 2016281 
 
Thus, larger farms have split off several functions that 
smaller operations still engage in. This has allowed them to greatly 
reduce their average production costs (Figure 1).282 One can see 
dramatic reductions in production costs as the scale of operation 
increases.283 The dramatic shift in the average scale of dairy 
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Figure 1. Average cost per cwt (hundredweight) of milk 
produced by herd size  
 
Source: MacDonald et al., 2016284 
 
A. Dairy Antitrust Issues in the 21st Century  
 
Economists have continued to find evidence of dairy policies 
redistributing income from consumers to producers.285 One study 
examined effects on different types of households.286 It found that 
marketing orders reduced wellbeing for families with young 
children, but benefited couples without children.287 This was because 
they reduced prices of processed products (such as cheese or yogurt), 
but raised prices of fluid milk.288 It also estimated that the program 
was more costly to lower income than high income households.289 
Another study found that in markets regulated by Federal Milk 
Marketing Orders, cooperatives are able to exert market power to 
raise the price of milk 9% above marginal cost, transferring more 
than $70 million per year from final consumers.290  
  
Dairy cooperative and marketing order activity has continued 
to receive antitrust scrutiny.291  In 2010, the DOJ and several states filed 
a civil antitrust suit against Dean Foods alleging that its purchase of 
processing plants owned by the Wisconsin cooperative, Foremost 
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Farms, violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act.292 DOJ asserted the 
acquisition would eliminate price competition from Foremost Farms, 
raising milk prices paid by schools, grocery chains, restaurants, and 
other retail outlets.293  Various cooperatives have been the defendants in 
class action suits, often settling out of court.294  
 
B. Emerging Environmental and Consumer Challenges 
 
As the U.S. population has shifted westward, so has dairy 
production, with significant growth in California, Idaho, New 
Mexico, and Arizona.295 Western operations also tend to be larger on 
average.296 Although U.S. milk production continues to grow, that 
production has been concentrated in fewer counties over time.297 In 
1969, 71 counties had one-quarter of all dairy cows, while half of all 
cows were in 247 counties.298 By 2017, a quarter of U.S. dairy cows 
were in just 16 counties (with all but one in the West), while half of 
all cows were in just 50 counties.299  
 
This concentration and westward movements present certain 
environmental challenges.300 First, this concentrates manure wastes 
on a smaller land area.301 As noted above, larger operations have 
moved away from feed and forage crop production, which means 
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there are fewer crop acres where manure might be applied as 
fertilizer.302  
 
This excess manure can lead to various types of water and 
air pollution.303 Nitrogen and phosphorus from manure can end up in 
surface and groundwater.304 One study of public wells in California 
found that one in ten of those sampled exceeded the maximum 
concentration level (MCL) of nitrate permissible under the Safe 
Drinking Water Act.305 Fertilizers on cropland of which dairy manure 
was a significant part, were the dominant factor accounting for the 
contamination.306 An EPA study of Washington found one in five 
sampled wells exceeding the nitrate MCL, with dairy manure again 
being a significant contributor.307 This same study also found a group 
of dairies in the Yakima Valley were the primary source for 
pharmaceutical contamination in the majority of dairy source water 
samples.308 Dairy production can also contribute to air pollution in the 
form of carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
and oxides of nitrogen (NO and NO2), ammonia (NH3), hydrogen 
sulfide (H2S), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) as well as 
particulate matter.309 Many of these are criteria pollutants regulated 
under the U.S. Clean Air Act.310 In addition, Section 304 of the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) 
requires farms to report NH3 and H2S emissions if 45.3 kg or more of 
either are emitted in any given 24-hour period.311 
 
In the mid-1970s, EPA established effluent limits for large 
feedlots (including dairies) under its Clean Water Act authority.312 In 
April 2003, EPA established regulatory requirements for 
concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs).313 After a legal 
challenge to the 2003 rule, EPA was remanded to revise some 
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portions of the regulations.314 The original 2003 regulations required 
all CAFOS to apply for National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permits.315 This designated all CAFOs as point 
sources of pollution.316 The revised rule only required CAFOs 
discharging (or proposing to discharge animal wastes) into U.S. 
water to obtain NPDES permits.317  
 
One potential technology for dealing with dairy wastes are 
anaerobic digesters, which use the methane in manure to produce 
electricity.318 Methane has 28-36 the global warming potential of 
carbon dioxide.319 Adoption of digesters, however, is less than nine 
percent on very large operations and nearly nonexistent for smaller 
operations.320 Digesters can reduce dairy electricity costs and 
potentially be a source of revenue through the sale of excess 
electricity.321 Another source of revenue is the sale of carbon offsets, 
but markets for such offsets has been slow to develop, with low 
prices.322  
 
In California, the dairy industry is a major source of methane 
emissions.323  Under Senate Bill 1383, signed into law in 2016, 
livestock operations will be required to reduce methane emissions 
starting in 2024, with a requirement to reduce emissions by 40% by 
2030.324 Using anaerobic digesters to produce electricity in 
California can be problematic, though, because the process can 
generate other air pollutants.325 Many dairies are already located in 
air pollution nonattainment areas regulated by the EPA.326 An 
alternative is to use the process to produce pipeline-injectable 
renewable natural gas that could potentially be used as transportation 
fuel.327 To be economically viable, even large dairies would have to 
operate cooperatively to achieve the needed scale economies. The 
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California Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) Program has a 
tradable credit system that allows to producers of eligible low-carbon 
transportation fuels to sell emission reduction credits.328 In 
December 2015, the California Air Resources Board announced it 
would allow LCFS credits for vehicle fuel produced from biogas that 
counts toward avoided dairy methane emissions.329 Lee and Sumner 
warn however that the viability of dairy production of biogas for 
vehicles depends on a raft of assumptions about future regulations 
and incentives facing transportation, air pollution, and energy 
production.330  
 
Another resource concern deals with water scarcity. Much 
dairy production has expanded in the arid Western United States.331 
With limited water supplies and continued population growth, water 
scarcity has grown acute.332 Prolonged drought and the potential 
lower precipitation under climate change exacerbates this scarcity 
problem.333 A future challenge for dairies will be the water 
requirements for feed and forage crops needed to support their 
herds.334 Such crops like alfalfa and corn silage tend to be relatively 
water intensive.335 In the future, dairies may have to rely on feed and 
forage from more distant markets.  
 
The dairy industry also faces challenges on the consumer 
side.336 US per capita milk consumption has been declining with each 
successive generation consuming less fluid milk than the generation 
before.337 Increases in cheese and yogurt consumption partially 
offsets this downward trend.338 Another challenge to the dairy 
industry is the rise of plant-based milks (e.g. soy milk, cashew milk, 
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almond milk, rice milk, oat milk, etc.).339 These plant-base products 
now represent nearly 7% of the combined animal and plant milk 
sales.340 The dairy industry has attempted legal action to prevent 
these products from using the term “milk” but, in a set of cases, it has 
been turned back (Ang v. WhiteWave Foods Co.; Gitson v. Trader 
Joe’s Co.; Painter v. Blue Diamond Growers).341 In 2017, Senator 
Tammy Baldwin (D-Wisconsin) introduced the Dairy Pride Act, 
which would prohibit plant-based products from using terms such as 
“milk,” “yogurt” or “cheese” on their labels.342 The bill, however is 
“languishing in committee.”343 Interestingly, it has no co-sponsors 
from major nut producing states such as California, New Mexico or 
Georgia.344 The first two are also major dairy states.345 Neither does 





The U.S. dairy industry has transformed itself from one 
isolated from world markets and highly dependent on government 
programs to an industry more globally and market oriented.347  
Impressive productivity growth and industry concentration has made 
this possible.348 Yet, such concentration (including geographical 
concentration) has certain negative environmental implications.349 A 
future challenge facing the industry will be compliance with 
environmental laws while navigating changes in global dairy 
markets. Increased consolidation of dairy cooperatives has also 
brought increasing challenges to the Capper Volstead exemptions for 
agricultural cooperatives to antitrust action.350 The rise of plant-
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based milk substitutes and declining per capita U.S. milk 
consumption threaten domestic demand.351 Yet, income growth (and 
increased demand for dairy products in developing countries) 
represents a market opportunity.352   
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